E 409 
.U75 
Copy 1 




1 



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ty.iu Congress 
M Session 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



j Document 
( No. 972 



THE MILITARY POLICY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 



DURING TilE 



MEXICAN WAR 



BY 



Bvt. Maj. Gen. EMORY FPTON 

United States Army 



[Extract from Senatf Uocunifnt No. 494, Sistj -second Congress, Second Session] 




IJ^ 



WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 






(H. Res. 493.) 

Ik the House of Representatives, 

May 9, 1914- 
Resolved, That there be reprinted as a separate document, for the use of the House 
of Representatives, three thousand copies of chapter fifteen of the military policy of 
the United States, by General Emory Upton, entitled "The Military Policy of the 
United States diu-ing the Mexican War," being pages one hundred and ninety-five to 
two hundred and twenty-two, inclusive, of Senate document Numbered Four hundred 
and ninety-fovu", Sixty-second Congress, second session; one thousand copies of the 
eame to be distributed through the folding room of the House and two thousand copies 
through the document room of the House. 
Attest: 

South Trimbi.e; Clerk. 
n 



^. OF D 

MAY 23 J914 



>k 






THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 

MEXICAN WAR. « 



Palo Alto, Resaca do la Palina, Monterey, Buena Vista, the siege 
and capture of Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco, and 
El Molino del Rey contributed an unbroken chain of victories preced- 
ing the entrance of our troops into the capital of Mexico. 

Successes so brilliant would apparently denote the perfection of 
military polic}^ but, paradoxical as it may seem, official documents 
establish the fact that they were achieved under the very same system 
of laws and executive orders which in the preceding- foreign war had 
led to a series of disasters culu)inating in the capture and destruction 
of our capital. 

The explanation of this paradox is to be found partly in the differ- 
ence of character of our adversaries, but more especially in the quality 
of the Regular Army with which we began the two wars. For the 
Mexican war, as for the war of 1812, the Government had ample time 
to prepare. The admission of Texas into the Union on the 1st of 
March, 1845, which was ratified b}^ that State on the ensuing 4th of 
July, was followed in August by the advance of our Army to Corpus 
Christi. 

On the 6th of August the Adjutant-General, by direction of the 
Secretary of War, Avrote to the commander. General Tajdor: 

Although a state of war with Mexico or an invasion of Texas by her forces may not 
take place, it is nevertheless deemed proper and necessary that your force should be 
fully equal to meet with the certainty of success any crisis which may arise in Texas, 
and which would require you, by force of arms, to carry out the instructions of the 
(government. * 

He was directed to learn from the authorities of Texas what addi- 
tional force could, in case of need, be placed at his disposal, and given 
authorit}' to call them into service, coupled, however, with the eco- 
nomical restriction: 

Such auxiliary volunteer force from Texas, when events, not now revealed, may 
justify their employment, Avill be organized and mustered under your orders, and be 
received into the service of the United States when actually required in the field to 
repel invasion, c actual or menaced, and not before. 

«Note indorsed upon this chapter in the handwriting of General Sherman was as 
follows: "I read this before sending to Garfield. I think it very good and suggest no 
amendment.— W.T.S." And again, in General Garfield's handwriting: "This is 
very good. — J. A. Garfield." — Editoks. 

ft House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Tliirtieth Congress, first session, p. 83. 

<: House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, pp. 83, 84. 

195 



196 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The same paragraph of this order informed the commander that — 

It should be understood that as yet no provision exists by law for the paymeat 
of such forces, but appropriations for that purpose will doubtless l)e made by ' 
Congress. * * * 

The amount and description of the force to be mustered into the service of the 
United States is left to your determination, and, of course, to be regulated by 
circumstances. « I 

August 28, 1845, the Secretary of War wrote: 

The information hitherto received as to the intentions of Mexico and the measures 
she may adopt, does not enable the Administration here to give you more explicit 
instructions in regard to your movements than those which have been already for- ' 
warded to you. There is reason to believe that Mexico is making efforts to assemble 
a large army on the frontier of Texas for the purpose of entering the Territory' and 
holding forcible possession of it. Of their movements you are doubtless advised, and 
we trust have taken, or early will take, prompt an<l efficient steps to meet and repel 
any such hostile incursion. Should Mexico assemble a large body of troops on the 
Rio Grande and cross it with a considerable force, such a movement must be regarded 
as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of hostilities. You will, 
of course, use all the authority which has been or may be given you to meet such a 
state of things. Texas must be protected from hostile invasion, and for that purpose 
you will of course employ to the utmost extent all the means you possess or can 
command. * * * 

Should Mexico declare war, or commence hostilities bj- crossing the Rio Grande 
with a considerable force, you are instructed to lose no time in giving information to 
the authorities of each or any of the above-mentioned States & as to the number of 
volunteers you may want from them respectively. Should you require troops from any 
of these States, it would be important to have them with the least possible delay. It 
is not doubted that at least two regiments from New Orleans and one from Mobile 
could be obtained and expeditiously brought into the field. You will cause it to be 
known at these places what numl)er and description of troops you desire to receive 
fromthem in the contemplated emergency. The authorities of these States v/ill be 
apprised that you are authorized to receive volunteers from them, and you may 
calculate that they will promptly J6in you when it is made known that their services 
are required. ^' 

To " meet with the certaint^y of success" an}' crisis that might arise 
in Texas, the commander was given on paper an aggregate of 4,000 
men of the Regular Army, with power to call from States, near and 
remote, such force of volunteers as in his discretion he might judge 
expedient. 

Three days later, August 26, the Secretary of War informed the 
Governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana by letter that Gen- 
eral Taylor had been appointed to command the "army of occupation" 
and requested him to furnish such a force of militia as General Taylor 
might designate. August 28 similar letters were sent to the Gov- 
ernors of Kentucky and Tennessee. August 30 the Secretary of War 
wrote General Taylor: 

The instructions heretofore issued enjoin upon you to defend Texas from invasion 
and Indian hostilities, and should Mexico invade'it, you will employ all your forces 
to repulse the invaders, and drive all Mexican troops beyond the Rio Grande. Should 
you judge the forces under your command inadequate, you will not fail to draw suf- 
ficient auxiliary aid from Texas, and, if there be need, from the States, pursuant to 
your previous instructions. It is not to be doubted that, on vour notification, volun- 
teer troops to the number you may require will rally with alacrity to your standard. 
You have been advised that the assembling of a large Mexican army on the borders of 
Texas, and crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, will be regarded by 

« House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 84. 

t> In addition to Texas these States were Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi Tennes- 
see, and Kentucky. See letter Hon. William L. ]\larcv, Secretarvof War to General 
Taylor, August 23, 1845.— Editors. ' ' ^^^"^^^^ 

c House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, pp. 84, 85. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 197 

the Executive here as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of 
hostilities. An attempt to cross the river with such a force will also be considered 
in the same lij^ht. * * * 

In case of war, either declared or made manifest by hostile acts, your main object 
will be the protection of Texas; but the pursuit of this object will not necessarily 
confine your action within the territory of Texas. IVIexico having thus commenced 
hostilities you may, in your discretion, should you have sufficient force and be in a 
condition to do so, cross the Rio Grande, disperse or capture the forces assembling 
to invade Texas, defeat the junc^tion of troops uniting for that purpose, drive them 
from their positions on either side of that river, and, if deemed practicable and expe- 
dient, take and hold possession of Matamoras and other places in the country. I 
scarcely need to say that enterprises of this kind are only to be ventured on under 
circumstances presenting a fair prospect of success. « 

The full significance of these orders should not escape our attention. 
They not only contemplated the possibility of an invasion, but going- 
far beyond, they looked to a bold and aggressive war to be prosecuted 
bv the same class of troops as were called out at the beginning of the 
war of 1812. 

But this was not all. In plain violation of the Constitution, w^hich 
only authorizes the emplo3"ment of militia "to execute the laws of the 
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," the orders, in case 
the General saw tit to call out the militia, sanctioned his entrance into 
a foreign coimtrv with troops of this description. As had already 
occurred in our history, such a force, pleading constitutional limita- 
tions, could liavc abandoned him the moment ho crossed the frontier. 

Without dwelling on this germ of dissolution in his army, had he 
called out and sought to rely upon raw troops, let us under his instruc- 
tions look at the possibility of receiving timely aid in case of need. 
Corpus Chi-isti is from 100 to 150 miles from the nearest point on the 
Rio Grande. Half of this distance, had the enemy been prepared, 
could possibly have been traversed without exciting the alarm of our 
commander. Five days later our regular forces, numbering on pai)er 
but 4,000 men, might have found themselves face to face with the 
Mexican army, with no option, under the orders, except to give or 
receive battle. Even had it taken ten days for the Mexican army to 
move from the Rio Grande to Corpus Christi, it would have been 
impossible for a single company or regiment of militia to have joined 
the army, except possibl}- from Texas. 

The want of care and foresight in these instructions to our commanders 
was soon to receive a more positive proof. On the ith of October, 
184.5, General Taylor wrote from Corpus Christi that if the Govern- 
ment, in settling the question of boundary, proposed the line of the 
Rio Grande as an ultimatum, he could not doubt that the settlement 
would be facilitated and hastened by taking possession of one or two 
points on or near the river.* 

This suggestion, submitted with great deference, appears to have 
been adopted, for on the 18th of January, 1846, the Secretar}- of War, 
b}' direction of the President, instructed him to advance and occupy as 
soon as -^ racticable "'positions on or near the east bank of the Rio del 
Norte." The Secretary stated in conckision: 

It is not designed, in our ]iresent relations with IMexico, that you should treat her 
as an .nemy; but should she assume that character by a declaration of war, or any 
open act of hostilit}' toward us, you will not act merely on the defensive, if your rela- 
tive means enable you to do otherwise. 

« House Ex. Doc. No. 00, Thiitieth Congress, first session, pp. 88, 89. 
6 House Isx. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 108. 



198 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Since instructions Avere jjiven you to draw aid from Texas, in case you should deem 
it necessary, the relations iK^tween that State and the United States have undergone 
some modification. Texas is now fully inc:)rporated into our union of States, and 
you are herel^y authorized to make a requisition upon the Executive of that State for 
such of its militia force as may be needed to repel invasion or to secure the country 
against apprehended invasion. « 

March 2, the Secretary again wrote: 

You can not fail to have timely notice of the approach of any considerable Mex- 
ican force, and, in that event, will promptly and efficiently use the authority with 
which you are clothed to call to you such auxiliary forces as you may need. The 
Governor of Texas has been notified that you are authorized by the President to make 
a requisition on him for troops, and it is not doubted that he will promptly respond 
to any call you may make for that purpose. 

Your advance to the Rio del Norte will bring you, as a matter of course, nearer to 
your assailants in case of hostilities, and at the same time remove you to a greater 
distance from the region from which auxiliary aid can be drawn. This consideration 
will naturally induce you to take more than ordinary care to be in a safe position 
and prepared to sustain yourself against any assault. ^ 

These instructions were still vague. They gave the commander the 
undoubted authority to call upon Texas at once, but as the use of the 
militia was qualified by the expressions "to repel invasion," "to secure 
the country against apprehended invasion," "the approach of a con- 
siderable Mexican force," the responsibility of incurring expense was 
thrown upon the commander, who, under the spirit of his instructions, 
could do nothing less than await future events. 

In the meantime the necessity for increasing the Regular Army as 
the only means of insuring econoni}' and safety was not lost sight of 
by the Government. General Scott, in his annual report in November, 
1845, recommended the addition of one regiment of artillery and three 
of infantry, as also an increase of the number of privates per company 
in all of the existing regiments. His plan for the increase of the rank 
and file contemplated the addition of 10 privates to each compan}^ of 
dragoons, and 20 to each corapan}^ of artillery and infantry, still fur- 
ther qualified by his preference for 100 privates per company. By 
adopting this plan he added: 

Our present skeleton Army may then, without an additional regiment and by the 
mere addition of privates, be augmented 7,960 men (more than doubled), making 
a total of noncommissioned officers, etc., of 15,843. 

I offer but elements. It is for higher authorities to determine the extent (if any) 
and mode of augmentation. But I may add that companies with but 42 privates 
cannot be isolated, as the ordinary service of the frontiers so frequently requires, 
and hence are often doubled to garrison even some of the smaller posts. ^ 

The Secretary of War in his annual report was not less statesman- 
like and explicit. After explaining that the concentration of troops 
in Texas had left the long line of the British frontier guarded by a few 
posts, that many fortifications on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were 
without garrisons, that the troops on the frontier were not more than 
sufficient to protect the settlements, and that apprehensions and anxiety 
existed in relation to the abandonment of posts, he continued: 

I would respectfully recommend that authority to increase the number of privates 
in a company, to any number not exceeding eighty should be vested in the President, 
tobe exercised at his discretion, with special reference to what the public interest 
might suddenly require. 

This inode of enlarging the Army, by adding to the rank and file of the present 
companies, will not, it is believed, impair, but, on the contrary, greatly improve their 

«House Ex. Dec. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 91. 
6 House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, J). 92. 
c Senate Ex. Doc. No. 1, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session, p. 210. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITJEl) STATES. 



199 



comparative efficiency, and on that account, an well as on the score of economy, is 
deemed preferable to that of effecting the same object by raising new regiments at 
this time. 

It is only in view of a probability that a force considerably lairger than a perma- 
nent peace establishment might soon be required that I should prefer the mode of 
increasing the Army by raising new regimenb^, organized on our present reduced 
scale. This scale is undoubtedly too low for actual service and has nothing to rec- 
onunend it to a i)reference under any circunistanccH but the facility it affords of 
expanding an army so organized by increasing the rank and file, and of rendering it 
effective for service in a shorter period than new regiments could be raised, organ- 
ized, and disciplined. " 

These reports accompanied the President's; message on the 2d of 
December, 1845. Had Conorcss acted prompt!}^ on their recommenda- 
tions it would not have been necessary, three months later, to have 
instructed General Taylor to depend upon raw troopsi. 

However, this officer left Corpus Christi on the 8tn of March, estab- 
lished en route a base of supplies at Point Isabel, and reached the Rio 
Grande on the 28th at a point opposite Matamoras. 

The next day he wrote to the Adjutant-General: 

The attitude of the Mexicans is so far decidedly hostile. An interview has been 
held, by my direction, with the military authorities in Matamoras, but with no satis- 
factory result. Under this state of things 1 must again and urgently call your atten- 
tion to the necessity of speedily sending recruits to this army. The militia of Texas 
are so remote from the border * * * that we can not depend upon their aid. 
The strength gained by filling up the regiments here, even to the present feeble 
estal)lishment, would be of very great importance. ^ . 

The army of occupation on arriving- opposite Matamoras, was com- 
posed as follows: 

"Army of Occuputlon^' on the frontier." of Texas, May, 1846- '' 



R'igiments and t-orpw. 


Number 

of 

companies. 


Present. 


Aggregate 

present 
and absent. 


Officers. 


Men. 


OLD ESTABUSH.MENT. 

General staff 




20 
13 
17 
13 
12 
11 
25 
23 
18 
30 
27 


'"'263' 

288 
185 
187 
169 
372 
295 
370 
345 
375 


20 




7 

\ 
4 
A 
10 
10 
10 
10 
30 


388 


First Artillery . 

Second Artillery . ... 


344 
217 


Third Artillery 


210 


Fourth Artillery 


20S 


Third Infantry 


464 


Fourth Infantry 


383 


Fifth Infantry 


472 


Seventh Infantry 


418 


Eighth Infantry" 


433 






Total 


" 


209 •> SSQ 


3,554 









By giving each of the 73 companies 100 privates, which might have 
been done but for a defect in the law, this force could have been raised 
from 3,554 to 7,300 men, which, with the full quota of officers, non- 
commissioned officers, and musicians, would have made this force 
exceed 8,000. This would have given it an etfective strength of nearly 
6,000 men present for duty. 

While these figures are interesting as showing that the needless 
exposure of our little army had its origin in fauity legislation, the 
weakness of its numbers in no way daunted its commander. He knew 

« Senate Ex. Doc. No. 1, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session, p. 195, 196. 
^House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 132, 133. 
<^ House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session, p. 8a— table. 



200 MILITARY POLiOY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

that four-fifths of his officers had received the benefits of professional 
training at the Military Academy or in the Florida war. Beyond this, 
he was conscious that the discipline and esprit de corps of his troops 
had been brought to the highest point by six months of training in the 
camp of instruction at Corpus Cnristi. With this preparation and, as 
has been observed, with practically no authority to increase his force 
till an invasion should actually take place, the commander was soon 
destined to confront a large and well-organized Mexican arm3^ 

The first collision occurred on the 25th of April, when Thornton's 
dragoons in a skirmish on the east bank of the river, suffered a loss of 
16 killed and wounded. The emergency having come, General Taylor 
the next day called upon the Governors of Louisiana and Texas for 
5,000 volunteers, but, as was to be expected, the call was too late. 
The enemy had already crossed the river in large force, and was then 
threatening his line of communication. Loath to abandon his position, 
he left the Seventh Infantry and two batteries of artillery to garrison 
Fort Brown, a field work on the left bank of the river, and on the 1st 
of May marched with the remainder of the army to Point Isabel. 
Having replenished his trains and provided for the safety of the depot, 
he began the return march to the Rio Grande on the evening of the 
Tth. The next day the crisis arrived. The enem}^ had invested Fort 
Brown, and at Palo Alto was drawn up in line of battle to dispute his 
further advance. 

The challenge was promptly accepted. At 2 o'clock our troops 
moved to the attack, and at dark, after a well-contested engagement, 
were mastei's of the field. Though beaten, the enemy was not hope- 
lessly demoralized. The next day he gave battle at Resaca de la 
Palma, but no longer able to resist the ardor of our troops was again 
defeated and driven in confusion across the Rio Grande, 

The force present at Resaca de la Palma numbered 173 officers and 
2,049 men, total 2,222, of whom but 1,700 were engaged.^ 

The losses in the two battles were 170 killed and wounded.* 

The strength of the enemy was estimated at 6,000, and his losses in 
killed and wounded at 1,000. 

In concluding his official report General Taylor stated: 

Our victory has been decisive. A email force has overcome immense odds of the 
beet troops that Mexico can furnish — veteran regiments perfectly equipped and 
appointed. Eight pieces of artillery, several colors and standards, a great number of 
prisoners, including 14 officers, and a large amount of baggage and public propertj' 
have fallen into our hands. The causes of victory are doubtless to be found in the 
superior quality of our officers and men. <■' 

The effect of this brilliant initiative was felt to the end of the war. 
It gave our troops courage to tight against overwhelming numbers, 
demoralized the enemy, and afforded a striking proof of the truth of 
the maxim, "That in war, moral force is to physical as three is to one," 
In all of the subsequent battles our troops were outnumbered two or 
three to one, yet they marched steadily forward to victory, and for 
the first time in our history temporarily convinced our statesmen, if 
not the people, of the value or" professional education and military 
discipline. 

The siege of Fort Brown was raised on the evening of the battle of 
Resaca de la Palma, On the 11th of May General Taylor proceeded 

a General Taylor's official report— Mongomery's Life of General Taylor, pp. 160, 161. 
^ House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session Table B, 
'^ Montgomery's Life of General Tajdor, m. 162, 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 201 

to Point Isabel to arrange for the reinforcements which had beg-un to 
arrive. On the 18th, all being in readiness^ he crossed the Rio Grande 
without opposition and closed the campaign by the occupation of 
Matamoras. 

Tlie brilliant victories of the army of occupation in its three weeks' 
campaign should not make us lose sight of the perils it encountered. 
The advance to the Rio Grande, it is true, was suggested by the com- 
mander, but in adopting the suggestion the only modification of his 
instructions seemed to make them more ambiguous by changing the 
emergency' for calling out raw troops from ''invasion or to secure 
the country against apprehended invasion,'' to the still more vague 
"approach of a considerable Mexican force." As the nearest gov- 
ernor was at least 300 miles awa3^ there was no possibility of receiving 
reenf orcements, even if called for in view of the suo-gested emergency, 
inasmuch as the enemy could cross the Rio Grancle and fight a battle 
on the same day. And such, in theory, was the plan of General Arista, 
the Mexican commander. The passage of the river by General Torrejon 
on April 24, which led to the skirmish on the 25th and to General 
Taylor's requisition for militia on the 26th, was to have been followed 
by the main body of the arm}- with the expectation of cutting our line 
of communication and forcing our arm}" to immediate battle. Delays, 
however, in crossing the river retarded the movement till the 1st of 
May, when the army returned to Point Isabel. 

The conflict was thus deferred till May 8, when, as we have seen, 
the battle of Palo Alto was fought three days before the first reeu- 
f orcements made their appearance at Point Isabel. This act suffi- 
ciently proves the want of reflection which dictated the President's 
instructions. Had they been transmitted through the general in 
chief, as is now Avisely required by law,** he could in a measure have 
been held responsible had he failed to ofl'er his professional advice. 
But whether or not he was taken into the confidence of the President, 
the fact still remains that in trying to economize by depending upon 
raw troops, the orders to our commanders invited a series of disasters 
from which we were alone rescued by the skill and fortitude of a 
disciplined army. 

Such was the excitement and alarm lest General Taylor's troops 
should be overwhelmed, that volunteers came forward far beyond the 
numbers specified in his requisitions. In New Orleans the veteran 
commander, General Gaines, who in nearly every disturbance since 
the war of 1812 had called out troops without waiting for instructions 
from the 'Government, set to work to organize and equip an army on 
his own responsibility, the term of enlistment being fixed at six 
months. So rapidly did he proceed, calling on the governors of Louis- 
iana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Missouri, that, before he could be 
stopped by being relieved from command, the number of troops sent 
to General Taylor exceeded 8,000. 

The total number of troops who responded to the calls of the two 
commanders was: 

Three months' men 1 , 390 

Six months' men illegally enlisted and held for three months, the legal term 

of the militia ' 11, 211 

Total 12, 601 

« The act of Congress directing that ordern to the Army he promulgated through 
the commanding general was passed March 2, 1867. and was repealed July 15, 
1870.— Editors. 



202 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The number of men received from Louisiana was 5,389. The arrival 
of these troops after the emergency had passed was attended by other 
evidences of mismanagement. They had been called to arms and 
embarked by a stroke of the pen, but when they landed, so destitute 
were thej^ of equipment and transportation that they were compelled 
to remain in idleness near their depots of subsistence until discharged 
from the service. Called out for three months, they returned to their 
homes without the satisfaction of having fired a shot, their losses by 
death being 145 — but 25 short of those killed and wounded (170) at the 
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. 

MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING THE WAR. 

The report of the first skirmish reached the War Department on 
Saturday, May 9, 1846. On Monday, the 11th, the President sent a 
message to Congress, then in session, stating that war existed by the 
act of Mexico, and adding that — 

In further vindication of our rights, and defence of the Territory, I invoke the 
prompt action of Congress to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the 
disposition of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus 
hastening the restoration of peace. To this end I recommend that autliority should 
be given to call into the i^ublic service a large body of volunteers, to serve for not 
less than six or twelve months, unless sooner discharged. A volunteer force is 
beyond question more efficient than any other description of citizen soldiers; and it 
is not to be doubted that a number far beyond that required would readily rush to 
the field upon the call of their country. I further recommend that a liberal pro- 
vision be made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies 
and munitions of war. 

The most energetic and prompt measures and the immediate appearance in arms 
of a large and overpowering force are recommended to Congress as the most certain 
and efficient means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and 
successful termination. « 

In these few brief lines is to be found the primary cause of all the 
subsequent delay and extravagance attending the prosecution of the 
war. Ignoring the experience of the Revolution, of the war of 1812, 
and later still of the Florida war, whose aggregate duration exceeded 
sixteen years, without pausing to compute, in the absence of railroads, 
the time required to transport troops from one to two thousand miles 
to the scene of hostilities, the President not only expressed his confi- 
dence in raw troops, but signified his belief in a formal recommenda- 
tion to Congress that we could bring a foreign war to a successful con- 
clusion in the brief space of from six to twelve months. 

The responsibility for this recommendation cannot wholly be laid 
upon the President. General Taylor, a witness of the feeble and pro- 
tracted prosecution of the two preceding wars, in his letter reporting 
the skirmish of Thornton's dragoons, stated: 

li a law could be passed authorizing the President to raise volunteers for twelve 
months, it would be of the greatest importance for a service so remote from support 
as this. ^> 

The promptitude with which Congress entertained and complied 
with the President's unfortunate recommendation finds no parallel in 

"House Ex. Doc. No. 196, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session, p. d 
House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 14L 



MILITAKY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 203 

our history.* The very day his message was received a bill to raise 
50,000 volunteers was intro'duced, and under the operation of the pre- 
vious question passed the House of Kcpresentatives. The next day it 
passed the Senate, and on the i;3th received the President's signature. 
The lirst section of the act read as follows: 

Whereas, by the act of the Ilepubhi- of iNIexico, a state of war exi.^ts between that 
Government and the United States, that, for the purpose of enabhng the Government 
of the United States to prosecute said war t(j a speedy and successful termination, the 
President be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ the militia, naval, and military 
forces of the United States, aiid to call for and accept the services of any number of 
volunteers, not exceeding 50,000, who may offer their services, either as cavalry, 
artillery, infantry, or riflemen, to serve twelve months after they shall have arrived 
at the place of rendezvous, or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged, accord- 
ing to the time for which they shall have been mustered into service; and that the 
sum of $10,000,000, out of any'moneys in the Treasury, or to come into the Treasury, 
not otherwise appropriated, be, and the same is hereby, appropriated for the purpose 
of carrying the provisions of this act into effect.'' 

The second section extended the term of the militia, when called into 
the service of the United States, to six months; the third section 
required the volunteers to furnish their own clothes, horses, and equip- 
ments, the arms to be furnished by the United States; the fourth sec- 
tion gave to each volunteer, as compensation for his clothing, the cost 
of clothing allowed to a regular soldier; the fifth section, ignoring the 
fact that the new force was not militia, authorized the officers to ])e 
appointed according to the laws of their several States; the ninth section 
gave the volunteers the same pay and allowances as regular soldiers, 
and allowed to those who were mounted a compensation for their 
horses of 40 cents per day. 

It ought not to surprise us if a law passed without debate should 
have contained many costly, if not dangerous, mistakes. The principal 
one of these was contained in the brief words "to serve twelve months" 
or "to the end of the war." Whether this unfortunate alternative 
may be regarded as evidence of the conviction on the part of Con- 
gress that a foreign war could be brought to a speedy and successful 
end in twelve months — a thing that has never occurred, and probaI)ly 
never will occur under our present system — or as an expression of its 
confidence in the wisdom and judgment of the President, it is not 
necessary to discuss. ' 

As might have been foreseen, the sequel proved that our best and 
only safeguard lies in wise legislation. The provisions of the law, 
more liberal than those recommended b}' the President, authorized 
him, at his option, to accept the services of volunteers "for twelve 
months " or ' ' for the war. " Instead of deciding upon the volunteers for 
the war, the President permitted the circular calling for the new troops 
to be couched in the exact wording of the law, thereby enabling each 
volunteer, at the expiration of twelve months, to elect whether he 
would receive his discharge or remain in service till the end of 
the war. 



« Under the joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, and the Act of Congress, 
dated April 22, 1898, President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 volunteers for the 
Spanish war on April 23. On May 31, a little more than a month after the President's 
proclamation, nearly all of this immense force of volunteers had been mustered into 
the United States service. Under the call of the President of May 25, 75,000 addi- 
tional volunteers were called for. The last volunteers under these two calls, were 
mustered in, August 24, 1898. — Editors. 

^Callan's Military Laws of the United States, first section, p. 867, 



204 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The dilemma in which the Government thus placed itself by mere 
want of foresight was foreshadowed in the annual report of the Secre- 
tary of War of December 5, 1846. After stating that the volunteers 
in their encounters with the enemy had " more than justified the 
expectations formed of that description of troops," but "that it was 
no disparagement to them to say that a regular force was to be pre- 
ferred in a war to be prosecuted in a foreign country," he added: 

Those who are now in the field, with the exception of one regiment sent out to 
California, entered the service under the alternative of continuing in it for twelve 
months or to the end of the war; and it is presumed they will have the right — at all 
events they will have the permission if they claim the right— to retire from the serv- 
ice at the end of that period, which will expire about the (end) 1st of June next.« 

The needless expense caused by this great mistake may be inferred 
from the fact that on the 13th of Ma}^, the day the law received the 
President's signature, requisitions were made upon the governors of 
the States of Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio — 

for a volunteer force equal to 26 regiments, amounting in all, with a battalion from 
the District and Maryland, to about 23,000 effective men, to serve for the period of 
twelve months or to the end of the war. ^ 

* * * * TT * * 

Nine regiments and one battalion of volunteers have been recently called for from 
various States to serve to the end of the war, and the information received at the 
Department gives the assurance that these requisitions will be promptly and cheerfully 
complied with. <-' 

The above showed the efi'ort made to retrieve the error already com- 
mitted and proved that the requirement of service "for the war" 
would in no wise have lessened the spirit of volunteering. 

Although not so dangerous to the success of our arms as the error 
just referred to, there was another defect in the law which diminished 
our strength and at the same time exposed the new levies to needless 
suffering and privation. Under the construction of the fourth section 
of the act, it was decided that the volunteers first called out should 
receive, on being mustered into service, the cost of a year's clothing, 
amounting to $42. The effect was thus explained by the Secretary in 
his report: 

This sum was not always appropriated for clothing, and many of them soon became 
so destitute as to suffer in their health, and in other respects to be scarcely fit for 
service. To this cause, in no inconsiderable degree, is to be ascribed the great dis- 
parity of sickness between volunteers and regular troops, the latter being well clothed 
by the Government and comparatively much more healthy. '^^ 

The military legishition on the 13th of May was not limited to rais- 
ing a force of volunteers. Another act of the same date authorized 
the President, by voluntary enlistment, to increase the number of pri- 
vates in each or any of the companies of the dragoons, artillery, and 
infantry to not exceeding 100, the number to be reduced to 64 when 
the exigency requiring the increase should cease. 

It will thus be seen that while during peace all discretion to increase 
the Army was withheld from the President through motives of econ- 
omy, or of jealousy of the Army, the moment war was declared the 
power of expanding it was freely committed to his trust, a power that 
enabled him, without adding an officer to the line, to raise the enlisted 
strength from 7,580 to 15,540. 

oHouse Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 54. 
& Report of Secretary of War. House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twentv-ninth Congress, second 
session, p. 47. 
''Same, p. 54. 
<^ House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-nintb Congress, second session, p. 56. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 205 

Had this discretion been g-ranted to tlie President ])y the law of 
1842, the army of occupation need not have been exposed to an attack 
by an army of three times its numbers; neither would there ha\'e been 
any occasion to expose to the ravages of disease the thousand-^ of three 
months' men who rushed to its rescue. 

On the 19th of Ma\^ a regiment of mounted riflemen intended for 
service in Oregon was added to the Army. The remaining laws, 
from Ma}^ 13 to the month of August, the end of the first session of 
the Twenty-ninth Congress, mainly related to the temporary increase 
during the war, of the various staff departments. 

The Arm}^ as organized by the foregoing laws, numbered 775 officers 
and 17,020 men; total, 17,812;" but so slow was the recruitment that, 
by the return of December 5, 1816, the aggregate present and absent 
numbered 10,690,* leaving a deficienc}^ of recruits amounting to 6,958. 

The reasons for this deficiency, the same as existed during the devo- 
lution and the War of 1812, were plainly set forth in the Secretary's 
report. 

The want of bettei' succes^s in recruiting is, I apprehend, mainly to be ascribed to 
the large number of volunteers which has, in the meantime, been called out. The 
volunteer service is regarded generally by our citizens as preferable to that in the 
Regular Army, and as long as volunteers are expected to be called for it will be diffi- 
eult to fill the ranks of tlie regular regiments unless additional inducements are 
offered or the terms of service modified. A small pecuniary bounty given at the 
time of enlistment, or land at the end of the term of service, would, it is believed, 
have a most beneficial effect. Probably an equally favorable result would flow from 
annexing a condition to the present period of service, allowing the recruit to be dis- 
charged at the end of the present war. It is presumed there are many thousand 
patriotic citizens who would cbeerfally enter the service for the war if they could 
return to the pursuits of civil life at its close. '•' 

The second section of the law for the increase of the staff depart- 
ments merits attention. It authorized the President — 

to call into the service, under the act approved May 13, 1846, such of the general 
officers of the militia as the service, in his opinion, may require, and to organize 
into brigades and divisions the forces authorized by said act, according to his 
direction. '^^ 

This section would apparently denote that Congress regarded the vol- 
unteers under the Constitution as substantialh' the same as the militia, 
and that conformably with the law of 1792 the Governors of States had 
an equitable right to the appointment of all the officers, from the high- 
est to the lowest grades. This partial adhesion to the State s^'stem was 
the means, in many instances, of placing the fortunes of the country, 
as well as the lives of our soldiers, in the hands of generals utterly 
ignorant of the military art at a time when the Government had at its 
disposal numbers of competent officers who had devoted their lives to 
the theory and practice of their profession. 

The fir.'-t law of the next session was pa.ssed on the 12th of Januar}', 
1847, and, pursuant to the recommendation of the Secretary of War, 
permitted recruits to enlist in the Regular Army for the period of " five 
years" or ''during the war." The recruits were also to receive a 
bounty of $12, $6 paid in hand, the remainder to be retained till the 
recruit joined the regiment. Had patriotic citizens been permitted to 
enlist in the Regular Army for the war at the outset, it is probable 
that the difficulties of recruitment might have been largely diminished. 

«Army Register, 1847. 

''House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 68. 
House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 53. 
<'Callan's Military Laws of the United States, first section, p. 373. 



206 MILITAEY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The legislation of the new session was not limited to the recruitment 
of the Army. On the 11th of February, but not till more than two 
months after the commencement of the session, Congress passed an 
act increasing- the Army by 1 regiment of dragoons and 9 of infantry, 
the regiments to serve, and the men to be enlisted, for the war. One 
of these infantr}' regiments was to be organized and equipped as volti- 
geursand foot riflemen, and to be provided with a rocket and mountain 
howitzer battery." 

The second section of the law, recognizing, in the absence of the law 
of retirement, the great scarcity of field ofiicers with the troops, 
authorized the appointment of an additional major to each of the regi- 
ments of dragoons, artillery, infantry, and riflemen, the majors to be 
selected from the captains of the Army. 

The necessity for a law of retirement, which was strongly urged 
during the Florida war, was again presented at the beginning of the 
Mexican war. On the 30th of July, 1846, the Adjutant-General 
reported that out of 12 field oflicers of artillery but 4 were able to 
take the field, the remainder being disqualified by reason of age, 
wounds, or other disabilities. In the infantry one-third of the 24 
field ofiicers were disqualified to take the field for the same reasons. 
In the 5 regiments of infantry, belonging to the army of occupation, 
there were present but 6 field oflicers, 2 of whom, General Taylor and 
General Worth, held commands higher than a regiment.^ 

The ninth section gave to every soldier, whether volunteer or regu- 
lar, who had enlisted for twelve months, a bounty, on receiving an 
honorable discharge, of 160 acres of land, or the equivalent of $100 in 
Treasurj^ scrip bearing interest at 6 per cent. Soldiers of less than a 
year's service were in like manner given a bounty of 40 acres of land 
or $25 in scrip. Other sections of this law provided for an increase of 
the Pay and Quartermaster's Departments, necessitated by the general 
increase of the line. The delay in the passage of the above law, which 
was recommended in the President's message at the beginning of the 
session, made it impossible for the new regiments to arrive in the field 
till late in the summer. 

March 3, 1847, another act was passed, authorizing an increase of the 
general oflicers to correspond to the number of new regiments which 
were to be discharged at the end of the war. The second section 
added a lieutenant-colonel and two captains to the Adjutant-General's 
Department. 

The third section, passed on the President's recommendation as a 
means of partially retrieving the mistake of short enlistments, author- 
ized him to organize into companies, battalions, and regiments such 
volunteers then in Mexico as would reenlist for the war. The section 
also contained the important recognition of the right of the President 
to commission the oflicers of volunteers. 

The fourth section gave to the volunteers so reenlisting a bounty of 
$12. The fifth section authorized the President to accept the services 
of individual volunteers to fill vacancies in any of the existing regi- 
ments of volunteers. These three sections clearly indicated a growing 
difliculty in procuring volunteers to replace casualties, a difliculty that 
would have increased in accordance with all previous experience in 
direct proportion to the prolongation of the war. 

«Callan's Military Laws of the United States, first section, p. 379. 

«> House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, pp. 72, 73. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



207 



The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth sections increased the Pay 
Department; the sixteenth section added 2 captains and G first lieuten- 
ants to the Ordnance Department; the eighteenth section added 2 com- 
panies to each regiment of artillerj^, and authorized 2 light l)atteries 
to be equipped in each regiment; the twentj-tirst section, recognizing 
the difficulty of recruiting by voluntary enlistment, authorized the 
President, in case of failure in tilling any regiment or regiments (regu- 
lars or volunteers), to consolidate such deficient regiment or regiments, 
and discharge all supernumerary officers. This law, passed the da}' 
before the close of tne second session of the Twenty-ninth Congress, 
completed all the military legislation of the war. 

As organized under the foregoing laws, the Army was composed as 
follows:" 



Officers. 



Men. 



Total. 



General staff * 

Medical department 

Pay department 

Military storekeepers 

Corps of engineers 

Corps of topographical engineers . 

Ordnance department 

Three regiments of dragoons , 

One regiment mounted riflemen.. 

Four regiments of artillery 

Sixteen regfments of infantry 

One regiment of infantry 



86 

85 

31 

17 

43 

36 

36 

118 

35 

208 

CIS 

47 



100 



620 
3,408 
1,146 
5,492 
17, 664 
1,104 



86 

&> 

31 

17 

143 

36 

656 

3,526 

1,181 

5,700 

IH, 312 

1 , 151 



Aggregate . 



1,356 ! 29,534 I 30.890 



♦Eleven assistant adjutants-general and 23 assistant quartermasters of the general staff, being 
detailed from the line and counted in their regiments, are, to avoid being counted twice, deducted 
from the number 8ii in summing up the total officers and aggregate of officers and men. 

The field officers of each of the line regiments consisted of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, and 2 
majors. 

The strength of each company and regiment in the different arms 
was as follows: 





Officers. 


Men. 


Total. 


First and second dragoons (old army) : 


3 

35 


113 
1,136 


116 


Regiment (10 companies) 


1,171 


Third dragoons (new army): 

Company (1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 2 second lieutenants) 

Regiment (10 companies) 


4 
48 


113 
1,136 


117 

1,184 






Mounted riflemen: 

Compan V 


3 

35 


114 
1,146 


117 


Regiment (10 companies) 


1,181 


Artillery: 

Compan V (1 captain, 2 first lieutenants, 1 second lieutenant) 


4 

52 


114 
1,373 


118 




1,425 






Infantrj- (old army): 

Company 


3 
34 


110 
1,104 


113 


Regiment (10 companies) 


1,138 






Infantry and voltigeurs (new army): 

Company (1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 2 second lieutenants) 


4 

47 


110 
1,104 


114 


Regiment (10 companies) 


1,151 







The adjutants in the regiments of dragoons and riflemen were extra 
lieutenants. The adjutants of artillery, infantry, and voltigeurs, as 



a Army Register, 1848. 



208 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UKITED STATES. 

also the regimental quartermasters in all arms of the service, were 
lieutenants detailed from the subalterns. This provision in time of 
war proved to be false economy. It necessarily reduced two com- 
panies in each infantry regiment to two officers each at the beginning 
of a campaign, and when casualties occurred, exposed it to the danger 
of being left without a commissioned officer. 

Having examined all military legislation since the announcement of 
hostilities, we ma}^ now return to the operations of the army on the 
Rio Grande. 

CAMPAIGNS OF MONTEREY AND BUENA VISTA. 

So rapid was the organization of volunteers under the President's 
call of May 13, 1846, that some of the new regiments arrived on the 
Rio Grande during the month of June, and such numbers soon fol- 
lowed that the commander was at a loss as to their employment and 
subsistence. In fact, when he proceeded in August up the Rio Grande 
to Camargo, and thence began his march to Monterey, with an army 
composed of two divisions of regulars and a field division of volun • 
teers — his entire force but little more than 6,000 — he was compelled 
to leave no less than 6,000 volunteers behind. His reasons for this 
were given in Order No. 108, issued at CJamargo on August 28, 1846: 

The limited means of transportation, and the uncertainty in regard to -the sup- 
plies that may be drawn from the theater of operations, imposes upon the command- 
ing general the necessity of taking into the field, in the first instance, only a 
moderate portion of the volunteer force under his orders. <:' 

It further appears that "while some 20,000 volunteers were sent to the theater of 
war, not a wagon reached the advance of General Taylor till after the capture of 
Monterey." ^ 

This lack of transportation developed in a striking manner the want 
in our War Department of a bureau of military statistics. General 
Jesup, the Quartermaster-General, wrote to the Secretary of War 
from New Orleans, on the 15th of December, 1845: 

Aa to the complaint in regard to the want of land transportation, it is proper to 
remark that there was no information at Washington, so far as I was informed, to 
enable me or the War Department to determine whether wagons could be used in 
Mexico. '■ 

This deficiency of wagons, however, in the end proved to our advan- 
tage, since it enabled the commander to form the volunteers who were 
left behind, into an army of the second line and to drill and prepare 
them for future campaigns. The importance which General Taylor 
attached to instruction was referred to by a writer who, after describ- 
ing the causes of our success at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 
stated: 

Never was the value of disciplined men more triumphantly demonstrated than on 
these glorious occasions; and since we have learned that General Taylor compels the 
volunteers with him to receive six hours' drilling per day and relieves them from all 
other duties, to make soldiers of them, we venture to predict that they, too, when 
they meet the enemy, Avill add to the reputation of our arms. "Rough and Eeady " 
will first make them soldiers and then win victories with them. 

This prophecy was not slow of fulfillment. In the battle around 
Monterey, from the 20th to the 23d of September, the volunteers fought 

« House Ex. Doc. No. 119, Twentv-ninth Congress, second session, p. 210. 
"Stevens's Campaigns of the Rio Grande and of Mexico, p. 21. 
c Montgomery's Life of General Taylor, p. 169. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 209 

with a steadiness that earned tlie applause of their comracies of the 
regulars. 

The forces engaged at Monterey numbered, — Mexicans, 10,000, of 
whom 7,000 were regulars; Americans, regulars and volunteers, 6,645. « 
The losses in these battles, which resulted in the cap)itulation of the 
city — the Mexican garrison being permitted to retire with their arms — 
were : 

Regulars, killed and wounded ^ 205 

Volunteers^ 282 

But a still greater triumph awaited the volunteers. In January, 
1847, nearl}' all the regular troops, as also a large number of volun- 
teers, were withdrawn to take part under General bcott in the campaign 
against the City of Mexico. 

This detachment, which it was expected w^ould confine General 
Taylor to the defensive, at least till after the arrival of new regiments 
of volunteers called out for the war, reduced the force with which in 
December he had advanced beyond Saltillo to about 6,000 men. 
Availing himself, with the instincts of a skillful commander, of this 
division of our forces. General Santa Ana advanced to Buena Vista, 
where, on the 22d and 23d of February, he sought to overwhelm and 
capture our arm)^ In this battle, the most desperate of the war, our 
forces, numbering 4,759 men, of whom but 517 were regulars, defeated 
the entire Mexican army, estimated at 20,000.^^ Our losses were 746 
killed, wounded, and missing. "^ The Mexican loss was estimated at 
1,500.-^" In his official report General Taylor gave the regular artillery, 
composed of the celebrated batteries of Washington, Sherman, and 
Bragg, the credit of saving the day. But the battle of Buena Vista, like 
all great battles, was fought chiefly by infantry, and the gallant volun- 
teers, who, against overwhelming numbers, successfully mantained the 
honor of our arms, had been undergoing field training for nearly eight 
months, a period twice as long as the time considered necessary to trans- 
form a recruit into a regular soldier. 

In referring to General Wool, General Taylor in his official report 
stated: 

The high state of discipline and instruction of several of the volunteer regiments 
was attained under his command, and to his vigilance and arduous service before the 
action and his gallantry and activity on the field a large share of our success may 
justly be attributed. {/ 

General Taylor and General Wool were not alone in their efforts to 
discipline and instruct the Army. The commander of the Mississippi 
Rifles, as also the field officers of the Second Kentucky Volunteers, of 
which the colonel and lieutenant-colonel laid down their lives, were 
former officers of the Army. 

a Ripley's War with Mexico, vol. 1, p. 198, 199. 

^ House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session, p. 10, Table B. 

cSame, p. 28, Table D. 

«fGeneral Taylor's official report, Ex. Doc. No. 1, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session. 
In his oflficial report of the battle, Santa Ana states that he left San Luis Potosi with 
18,133 men, and that his artillery train consisted of 17 pieces. General orders found 
on the battlefield indicate that he had 20 pieces of artillery. In summoning General 
Taylor to surrender, the Mexican commander gave his strength at 20,000 men, — 
Editors. 

« House Ex. Doc, No. 24, House of Representatives, Thirty-first Congress, first 
eeeeion, p. 13 B and 29 D. 

/General Taylor's official report, Montgomery's Life of General Tavlor, p. 299, 

(/Montgomery's Life of General Taylor, pp. 298, 299. 

H. Doc. 972, G3-2 2 



210 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

In addition to this preparation, when the critical moment arrived, 
the courage of the men was everywhere stimulated by the example 
and conduct of the artillery. Without waiting for support it moved 
rapidly from position to position, over the roughest ground, "its 
well-directed fire" dealing destruction "in the masses of the enemy." 
"Always in action at the right place and the right time,"^ it served 
as rallying points for the broken and hard-pressed infantry, which 
but for its presence must have been driven in confusion from the field. 

In this one fact — the ability of the infantry to rally — when in some 
regiments nearly all of the field ofiicers were killed or disabled, we have 
the crowning proof that the volunteers at Buena Vista were no longer 
raw troops. They gave evidence to the true statesman, that in rescu- 
ing victory from defeat, their discipline, no less than their patriotism 
had made them worthy to receive the applause of a grateful country. 
The battle of Buena Vista, begun on the anniversary of Washington's 
birtbda}", terminated the brilliant exploits of the army of occupation. 

CAMPAIGN OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. 

Up to the capitulation of Monterey it was hoped that by occupying 
the northern provinces, Mexico would accept propositions of peace; 
but when subsequent events proved this idea to be fallacious, it was 
decided to carry the war to her capital through the gateway of Vera 
Cruz. Accordingly, in November, 1846, General Scott sailed for 
Brazos (Point Isabel), where he collected and organized an army, 
which, like General Taylor, he was to lead from vi(;tory to victory. 

Before proceeding to the field, he submitted on the 2Tth of October, 
a memorandum to the Secretary of War, in which he estimated the 
minimum force required to capture Vera Cruz at 10,000 men; this 
number, with a view to ulterior operations, to be increased by the 
month of March to 20,000; the reinforcements to be composed of vol- 
unteers and the new regiments of regulars expected to be raised by 
the next Congress. 

On the 33d of November, before leaving Washington, he expressed 

a In reporting the battle, General Taylor said : In the meantime the tiring had 
ceased upon the principal field. The enemy seemed to confine his efforts to the pro- 
tection of his artillery, and I had left the plateau for a moment, Avhen I was called 
thither by a very heavy musketry fire. On regaining that position I discovered that 
our infantry (Illinois and Second Kentucky) , had engaged a greatly superior force of 
the enemy — evidently his reserves — and that they had been overwhelmed by num- 
bers. The moment was most critical. Captain O'Brien, with two pieces, had sus- 
tained his heavy charge to the very last, and was finally obliged to leave his guns on 
the field — his infantry support being entirely routed. Captain Bragg, who had just 
arrived from the left, was ordered at once into battery. Without any infantry to 
support him, and at the imminent risk of losing his guns, this officer came rapidlj^ 
into action, the Mexican line being but a few yards from the muzzle of his pieces. 
The first discharge of canister caused the enemy to hesitate; the second and third 
droye hina back in disorder and saved the day. The Second Kentucky Regiment, 
which had advanced beyond supporting distance in this affair, was driven back and 
closely pressed by the enemy's cavalry. Taking a ravine which led in the direction 
of Captain Washington's cavalry, their pursuers became exposed to his fire, which 
soon checked and drove them back with loss. In the meantime the rest of our artil- 
lery had taken position on the plateau, covered bvthe Mississippi and Third Indiana 
Regiments, the former of which had reached the ground in time to pour a fire into 
the right flank of the enemy, and thus contribute to his ipulse. In this last conflict 
we had the misfortune to sustain a very heavy loss. Colonel Hardin, First Illinois. 
and Colonel McKee and Lieutenant-Colonel Clay, Second Kentucky Regiments, fell 
at this time while gallantly heading their comuiands. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 211 

to the Secretary of War a willingness to proceed with the expedition, 
if necessary, with 8,000 men. From Brazos, January 12, he wrote to 
the Secretar}^ of War: 

Should success crown our arms on the coast — and I will not anticipate a failure — I 
beg to repeat that a reenforcement of 10,000 or 12,000 regulars (new regiments and 
recruits for the old) will l)e indispensable (about April), to enable me to make a con- 
secutive advance on the enemy's capital." 

The necessary troops, regulars and volunteers, having- been collected 
and embarked at Brazos, General Scott sailed for Vera Cruz, where 
he arrived on the 7th of March, disembarked on the 9th, invested the 
city on the 10th, and on the 29th received its surrender. After the 
surrender the organization of our army, before moving on the 
enemy's capital, was as follows:'' 

First Regular Division, Bvt. Maj. Gen. William J. Worth, commanding: Light 
Company A, Second Artillery; Second Artillery, 8 companies; Third Artillery, 4 
companies; Fourth Infantry, 6 companies; Fifth Infantry, 6 companies; Sixth Infan- 
try, 5 companies; Eighth Infantry, 7 companies. 

Second Regular Division, Brig. Gen. David E. Twiggs, commanding: Light Com- 
pany K, First Artillery; howitzer and rocket company; regiment mounted rifles, 
9 companies; First Artillery; Fourth Artillery, 6 companies; Second Infantry, 9 com- 
panies; Third Infantry, 6 companies; Seventh Infantry, 6 companies. 

Volunteer division, Major-General Patterson commanding: Third Illinois; Fourth 
Illinois; New York regiment, 10 companies; First Tennessee; Second Tennessee: 
Kentucky regiment; First Pennsylvania, 10 companies; Second Pennsylvania, 10 
companies; South Carolina regiment, 11 companies; detachment of mounted Ten- 
nessee Volunteers. 

Not assigned to divisions: One company of engineers; 1 company of ordnance; 6 
companies of cavalr}'. 

The strength of the army, composed of 21 different regiments or parts of regiments, 
was less than 12,000 men. '^" 

Having established his base of operations and completed the organi- 
zation of his troops, General Scott on the 8th of April began his march 
into the interior, and on the 18th, at Cerro Gordo, attacked and over- 
threw the entire Mexican army, capturing seven standards, 3,000 pris- 
oners, and 13 pieces of artiller}'. So complete was the defeat that, in 
the language of the general in chief, "Mexico had no longer an army." 
The road to the capital now la}' open before him, but when he sought 
to advance a defect of legislation put an end to his conquests. The 
policy of short enlistments, which in so many wars had caused our 
troops at critical moments to abandon their commanders, was to find 
its logical conclusion in the dissolution of our army in the heart of an 
enemy's country. 

This result, as might have been foreseen, was due to the option 
given to the volunteers "to serve twelve months" or "to the end of 
the war," a result that might have been prevented had an\' member of 
Congress familiar with the history of his country sought to strike out 
the first part of the fatal alternative, or to substitute for it the term 
of three 3^ears. Wisdom, prudence, econom}^ humanitj^, and every 
consideration within the pale of statesmanship, demanded the creation 
of an army enlisted for the war, and as the popular enthusiasm would 
have responded to such a call with the same alacrity as for twelve 
months, the defect in the law can only be ascribed to the haste, if 
not thoughtlessness, Avhich has so often characterized our military 
legislation. 

« Stevens' Campaigns of the Rio Grande and of Mexico, p. 48. 
^Memorandmn furnished by Adjutant-General. 
''Scott's Autobiography, vol. 2, p. 420. 



212 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Fearing exposure to the yellow fever, and beginning to look forward 
to their discharge six weeks before the expiration of their term of 
enlistment, General Scott, on the 4th of Ma}^ parted with seven of his 
eleven regiments of volunteers, numbering in the aggregate 4,000 men. 
Thus reduced hy discharge, by expiration of service, and by disease 
to 5,820 '^ effective men, our army, which had advanced to Puebla, 
within three days' march of the enemy's capital, was compelled for 
more than two months to. remain on the defensive, while the enemy, 
profiting by the delay, reorganized an army of five times its number. 
In fact, after the discharge of the volunteers, having heard of no reen- 
forcements, except 960 recruits ordered from New York and Newport, 
Kentucky, General Scott a])andoned Jalapa, and with no communica- 
tion with his base of supplies he found himself needlessly exposed to 
the danger of investment and capture. Formidable as had been our 
preparations, they appeared about to collapse, a calamity that was only 
averted by the superior quality of our troops. 

Had the small force of General Scott, embracing nine-tenths of the 
Regular Army, been captured, experience teaches us that with the 
system of short enlistments and inexperienced officers, 100,000 raw 
troops could not have retrieved the disaster. Our failure to appre- 
ciate the demands of a foreign war was again proven at this period of 
our history. The recommendations for a numljer of new regular regi- 
ments, it will be remembered, were not adopted till the 11th of Febru- 
ary, 1847, which so delayed their organization that they arrived only in 
time to participate in the brief operations about the City of Mexico. 

The appointment of the officers of these regiments reveals another 
inconsistency in our military policy. From its foundation the Mili- 
tary Academy had been assailed by enemies who demanded its aboli- 
tion; but Congress had .wisely resisted this clamor, and, refusing to 
yield to a memorial from the legislature of a State which to-day among 
its West Point graduates boasts of a Grant, a Sherman, and a Sheridan, 
had steadily voted appropriations, until at the outbreak of the Mexican 
war nearly every regular oflicer below the rank of major had received 
the benefit of its instruction. Educated at no inconsiderable cost, had 
these officers been appointed colonels and captains of the new regi- 
ments, in a couple of months the latter would have begun to acquire the 
steadiness of veterans, and in battle would have made a handsome 
return to the nation for the expense incurred in training its officers. 

But a polic}^ so wise was prevented by a defect or an omission, in 
the law, which was explained by the Secretary as follows: 

There is so much doubt whether officers now in the Regular Army would take com- 
missions of not more than one or two grades above those which they now hold, that 
it is not probable many will be selected for the new regiments. As" these regiments 
are to be disbanded by express provision of the law which authorizes them, at the 
conclusion of the war, those officers who may be transferred to them would be in 
great danger of being thrown out of the Army. & 

Had the law, with the object of using professional training to the 
greatest advantage, prescribed that even the field officers of the new 
regiments should be selected, as in the case of the additional majors, 
from the officers of the Army, with the further provision that they 
should not vacate their commissions, the new troops could soon have 
been made efficient. In the absence of such a provision, the Army 

« House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 993. 

i!* House Ex. Document No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 873. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITP:u STATES. 213 

Register shows that, with the exception of six officers who were, or 
had been, in the Regular Army, the officers of the new regiments, 
numbering more than -iOO, were' appointed fresh from civil life/' 

As a consequence of tliis policy inexperienced colonels and ignorant 
captains led the new regiments to battle, while in the old battalions 
the future commanders of our armies were trudging as lile closers in 
rear of their companies. Such a policy, bad enough for the infantry, 
when applied to the dragoons, an arm of service requiring for its effi- 
ciency years of training, could only result in a waste of the public 
treasure. At the same time that the new regiments were organizing, 
the Government as late as April, 1817, continued to accept fresh vol- 
unteers, all, it is needless to say, enlisted '"for the Avar." 

These new troops, both regulars and volunteers, as fast as organized 
were forwarded to the little army which for three months had remained 
at Puebla, overlooking an enemy's capital numbering more than 180.000 
people. The slowness with which reinforcements were forwarded to 
Mexico shows how impossible it would have been to afford succor to 
our arm}' had the enem}^ been able to take the offensive. 

On the 4th of June a small detachment of 3 companies of dragoons 
and 6 of infantry, composed almost wholl}" of recruits, left Vera Cruz 
with a large train, but being attacked by guerrillas the second day out 
the}^ were compelled to halt for reinforcements. June 8 General Cad- 
walader, with another detachment of 500 men, marched to the support 
of Colonel Mcintosh, joined him on the 10th, and together after a 
sharp skirmish pushed on to Jalapa, where the}- arrived on the loth. 
The 19th, having been joined by the garrison of Jalapa, General Cad- 
walader again resumed the march, arriving on the 21st at Perote. 
Here part of his animals having given out, he had to wait till the 
23d to refit, when, as he was about to march, he received orders from 
General Pillow, who had arrived at Vera Cruz on the 13th, to dela}' 
till their forces could unite. This being accomplished on the 1st of 
July, the combined force of 4,500 men resumed the march on the 2d 
and 3d, and on the 8th joined the army at Puebla. The arrival of the 
puny reinforcement more than two months and a half after the l^attle 
of Cerro Gordo raised the total strength of the army to but 10,276, of 
whom 2,215, or nearly one-fourth, were sick.'' 

On the 19th of Juty another reinforcement of 3,000 men, composed 
chieti}' of the new regular regiments and recruits for the old army, 
left Vera Cruz under General Pierce, and, reduced to 2,429 men,'' 
reached Puebla on the (3th of August. Reinforced in the aggregate to 
nearl}^ 14,000 men, of whom 3,000 were sick or in hospital, while other 
detachments were made to guard this line of comuumications, General 
Scott, on the 7th of August, resumed the offensive against an army 
estimated by the Mexicans themselves at 36,000 men and 100 pieces of 
cannon.'' The composition of his army at the moment of advancing 
in the face of such overwhelming numbers was as follows: 

« The act of Congress of jMarch 2, 1899, authorized the President to raise a force of 
not exceeding 35,000 volunteers. It has been said of these regiments that the Gov- 
ernment has never had more satisfactory volunteers, and this has been largely attrib- 
uted to their method of organization, and to the fact that the senior officers in each 
of the regiments were selected on their efficiency records from the officers of the 
Regular Army. — Editors. 

b House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtietli C^ongress, Fii-st session, p. 1013. 

c Ripley's YV'ar with Mexico, vol. 2, p. ICH. 

<^ Ripley's War with Mexico, vol. 2, p. IHl. 



214 MILITAEY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Gen. William J. Wortli'i^ division. 

Bvt. Col. John (Turland's brigad3: Second Artillerj^, Third Artillerj^, Fourth 
Infantry. 

Col. N. S. Clarke's brigade: Third Infantry, Sixth Infantry, Eighth Infantry, Light 
Company A, Second Artillery; Light battalion. 

Gen. David E. Twigg's division. 

Gen. P. F. Smith's brigade: First Artillery; Third Infantry; Kifle Regiment. 
Col. B. Riley's brigade: Fourth Artillery; Second Infantry; Seventh Infantry; 
Engineer company; Ordnance company; Light Company K, First Artillery. 

Gen. Gideon J. Fillow's division. 

Gen. F. Pierce's brigade: Ninth Infantry; Twelfth Infantry; Fifteenth Infantry. 
Gen. George Cadwalader's brigade: Voltigeurs; Fourteenth Infantry; Eleventh 
Infantry; Light Company I, First Artillery. 

Gen. J. A. Quitman's division. 

Gen. James Shields's brigade: New York Regiment; South Carolina Regiment; 
Marine Corps. 

Lieut. Col. S. E. Watson's brigade: Second Pennsylvania Volunteers; H Company, 
Third Artillery; C Company, Third Dragoons. 

Gen. Wm. S. Harney's brigade: First Battalion Cavalry; Second Battalion Cavalry. 

The relative composition of the army of regulars and volunteers 
should not escape the reader's attention. The President in his mes- 
sage asked Congress to give him "a large body of volunteers to serve 
not less than six or twelve months." Congress, going beyond the 
request, gave him authority to call out 50,000 for "twelve months," 
or "to the end of the war," and yet, through his own mistake, when 
the crisis arrived there were but four half -tilled regiments present to 
participate in the conflict. 

But those regiments organized in December of 1840 had had the 
benefit of eight months' training, had already participated in the siege 
of Vera Cruz and the battle of Cerro Gordo, and were worthy of being 
called reliable troops. Advancing with an army of less than 10,000 
effectives, the brilliant victories of Contreras, Cherubusco, El IMolino 
del Key, and Chapultepec opened the gates of the capital, which Gen- 
eral Scott entered on the 14th of September. In the series of battles, 
beginning on the 20th of August, our largest force engaged was 8,479; 
our loss in killed and wounded was 2,703, which reduced the army 
when it reached the city to less than 6,000 men. 

The aggregate strength of the three regiments of volunteers which 
participated in these battles — the fourth being left to garrison Puebla — 
was on the morning of the battle of Contreras 1,580. The aggregate 
strength of the Army, regulars and volunteers, on the same date was 
11,052." The forwarding of troops after the crisis had passed was not 
unlike that which followed the battle of Palo Alto. 

On the 19th of July the Secretary of War wrote to General Scott 
that since the 24th of May he had heard of the arrival at Vera Cruz 
"of 4,603 regular troops (new levies and reorganized companies), 300 
marines, and two companies of Pennsylvania Volunteers 133 strong," 
making an aggregate of over 5,000 men.^ 

« Official report of General Scott, dated National Palace, Mexico, September 18, 
1847.— A. G. O. 

^ House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, first session, p. 1003. 



i 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 215 

On the 6th of October he ag-Min wrote: 

There is also a considerable volunteer force which was called out many months 
eince, and has been slow in organizing, now on its way to your column. The Adju- 
tant-General's estimate herewith of the total number of these troops and other de- 
tachments make the aggregate force en route under orders and being mustered into 
service about 15,000, since (ieneral Pierce's advance from Vera CVuz on the lltli of 
July.« 

Notwithstanding these numDers it was not until October 18/' that 
General Lane with 8,300 reached Puebla, November 10, General Pat- 
terson with 2,600 '^ arriA'ed at Jalapa; December li, these combined 
reinforcements, advancing- in two or three columns, concentrated at 
Puebla to the number of 9,000;'' December 17, their advance reached 
the City of Mexico. In the meantime such was the sickness of the 
troops in the arm}^ at the capital that those present for duty on Decem- 
ber -1, were reported by General Scott as only about 6,000. ' These 
figures show that in consequence of errors of statesmanship and a bad 
system of recruitment we needlessly exposed our army to the dangers 
of capture for a period of more than six months. Had the strength 
of the army during this time been calculated with nicet}", based on a 
knowledge of the numbers and discipline of the enemy, we might 
applaud the apparent economy which achieved such results; but with 
the fact alreadj^ stated, that for want of a bureau of military statistics, 
the chief of the most important department of supply could not learn 
at Washington whether wagons could be used m Mexico, we must 
ascribe the perils of our troops to the same mismanagement and want 
of reflection that supplied the means for military operations in 1812. 

Notwithstanding the delays in forwarding men and supplies, such 
was the quality of our troops that the enemy, no longer able to oppose 
them, listened to propositions of peace, and on the 2d of February, 
1848, ratified the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Pursuant to thia 
treaty and the President's proclamation, our army on the 6th of the 
following July, 26 months after the commencement of hostilities, 
e\'acuated Mexican territory. 

STATISTICS. 

With the salient facts before us, that General Taylor fought the first 
battles of the war with 2,100 regulars, when, but for the defect of the 
lg,w, he might have had, by a simple increase of the rank and file, a 
force of 8,000; that the 13 regiments of the Regular Army with v>diich 
General Scott landed at Vera Cruz could have been raised to 15,000 
men; that with such an army he could have entered the City of Mexico 
on the heels of Cerro Gordo; that at no time before the event his max- 
imum force exceeded 13,500,-^" and that after a brilliant series of battles 
he finally entered the Mexican capital with less than 6,000 men, let ua 
next consider the number of troops the Government employed: 

Regulars {old establishment). 

Army of occupation, May, 1846 3, 554 

Number of recruits and troops who joined the Army in Mexico 15, 736 

Total 19,290 

« House Ex. Doc. No. 60, Thirtieth Congress, lirst session, p. 1008. 

&Same, p. 1030. 

cSame, p. 1031. 

a Same, p. 1039. 

«Same, p. 1033. 

/Scott's Autobiograpliy, \ol. 2, p. 420. 



216 MILITAEY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Regulars {new estahlishineni) . 

1 regiment of dragoons, 8 regiments oi infantry, 1 regiment of voltigeurs 11, 186 

Total, Regular Army 30, 476 

Battalion of marines 548 

Total, regular forces 31, 024 

Reenforcements for the old army to the number of 19,066 started for 
Mexico, leaving, after deducting 15,736 who joined, 3,930 who never 
reached their destination. The whole number of troops and recruits 
sent to the new establishment was 11,976, of whom 790 failed to join. 
For the old establishment from May 1, 1846, to July 5, 1848, 21,018 
men were enlisted. For the new establishment during the same period 
the number was 13,991. Total 35,009. 

Volunteers. 
General staff 272 

Mustered for three months (militia)' 1, 390 

Mustered for six months, but held only for three 11, 211 

Mustered for twelve months 27, 063 

Mustered for the war 33, 596 

Total 73,260 

Total staff and volunteers 73,532 

Resolving the volunteer force of 73,260 into the different arms of 
service, it consisted of — 

Cavalry or mounted troops 16, 887 

Artillery 1, 129 

Infantry 55, 244 

Resolving it into officers and men, it consisted of — 

Officers 3, 131 

Noncommissioned officers and privates 70, 129 

In this mass of men, who wei'e totally inexperienced at the begin- 
ning of their service, there was a leaven of between thirty and forty 
officers who were in, or had been in, the Regular Army. The total 
force employed during the war, including 31,024 regulars and marines, 
was 104,284. 

The actual number mustered in, exclusive of the army of occupation 
(3,554) and 548 marines, was 100,454. 

From these figures it will be perceived that the regular troops, 
31,024, exceeded more than six times the number of regulars and 
volunteers with whom Taylor at Buena Vista defeated the entire 
Mexican army ; while, omitting the three and six months' men and 
adding 31,024 to the 60,659 volunteers for twelve months and the war, 
the aggregate, 91,683 regulars and volunteers, was nine times as great 
as the effective strength of the army with which Scott fought the 
decisive battles around the City of Mexico. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 217 

CAeiJALTIES. 

The casualties among the different classes o£ troops were as follows: 

OLD ESTABLISHMENT (19,290). 

Discharged : 

Expiration of service 1, 561 

Disability 1 1 782 

By order and civil authority 373 

3,716 

Killed in battle: 

Officers ii 

Men 422 

463 

Died of wounds: 

Officers 22 

Men 307 

329 

Wounded; 

Officers 118 

Men 1,685 

1,803 

Total wounded, killed, and died of wounds 2, 595 

Deaths (disease and accidents) : 

Officers 117 

Men 3,437 

3, 554 

Kesignations * 37 

Desertions 2, 247 

NEW ESTABLISHMENT (11,186). 

Discharged : 

Expiration of service 12 

Disability 767 

Bv order and civil authority 114 

893 

Killed in battle: = 

Officers 5 

Men 62 

67 

Died of wounds: 

Officers 5 

Men 71 

76 

Deaths (disease and accidents): 

Officers 46 

Men 2, 218 

2,264 

Wounded: 

Officer? 36 

Men 236 

272 

Total wounded, killed, and died of wounds 415 

Total killed, wounded, and died of wounds, Regular Army 2, 946 

Resignations 92 

Desertions ^^'^ 

MARINES. 

Killed and died of wounds ^ 

Deaths (disease, etc. ) -J 

Total 12 



218 MILITARY POLICY OF oteB, UNITED STATES. 

VOLUNTEERS (73, £60). 

Discharged : 

Disability 7,200 

Other causes 1, 697 

Killed in battle and died of wounds 607 

Killed and wounded« 1, 831 

Deaths from disease and accident 6, 408 

Resignations 279 

Desertions 3, 876 

The number killed, wounded, and died of wounds, in the three classes 
of troops was as follows: 

Regulars (19,290), old establishment 2,595 

Regulars ( 11,186 ) , new establishment 415 

Volunteers (73,260) « 1,831 

The losses in killed and died of wounds among the volunteers were 
distributed as follows: 

Three and six months' men (12,601) 16 

Twelvemonths' men (27,063) 439 

Volunteers for the war ( 33, 596) 152 

Total & 607 

The deaths from disease and accidents were as follows: 

Three and six months' men 129 

Twelve months' men 1, 859 

Volunteers for tlie war 4, 420 

Total c 6, 408 

Of the IG killed or died of wounds among the three and six months' 
men (all held for three months), 15 belonged to the Texas rangers, two 
companies of whom were organized by General Taylor before leaving 
Corpus Christi, and who were with him in the skirmishes preceding 
Palo Alto. 

This loss of but one man among the remaining 12,000, who were 
called out too late to participate in the battle of Palo Alto and for too 
short a period to be available for operations beyond the Rio Grande, 
indicates how useless was their service. 

The same remark applies with almost equal force to the 33,000 vol- 
unteers for the war, called out to replace the 27,000 men who had had 
the benefit of a ^^ear's campaign and instruction. An analysis of their 
losses shows that of the 152 killed and died of wounds, 118 fell upon 
the four regiments (the Second New York, First and Second Pennsyl- 
vania, and First South Carolina), which were with Scott's army at 
Cerro Gordo and remained with it till the hour of its triumph. Thus 
it appears that, excepting the Texas rangers from the thr^e and six 

« The killed and wounded in the entire force of volunteers is taken from the 
Statistical Report of the Surgeon-General, Ex. Doc. No. 96, Senate, Thirty-fourth 
Congress, first session, p. 621. This nvmiber is taken in preference to 1,778, com- 
puted from Ex. Doc. No. 24, H. R., Thirtj'-first Congress, first session; both are 
based on figures of the Adjutant-General, compiled from the reports of commanders 
and regimental and company returns. As stated by the Adjutant-General, "The 
statistics of the war are given as close approximation only." 

*> House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirtv-first Congress, first session, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, 
Table C. 

e House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 
Table C. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 219 

months' men and the four o-iillant regiments which entered the Mexi- 
can capital from the volunteers called out for the war, the total loss 
among- more than 42,000 men was but 35 in killed and died of their 
wounds. 

If we choose to carry the argument further and add to the 42,000 
the 11,000 new regulars who were likewise called out to repair the 
mistake of twelve-month enlistments, it will appear that we had more 
than 53,000 men in the service, whose losses in killed and died of 
wounds numbered but ITS/' Laying aside the Tresident's rcsponsi- 
bilit}' for this result, it is important to observe that 12,000 of these 
men (militia) were called out because our defective laws gave the Presi- 
dent no power to increase the rank and tile of the Army, while 41,000 
were called out to remed^^ another legislative blunder which permitted 
him to accept volunteers for twelve months instead of for the war. 

To establish the fact that these 41,000 men, regulars and volunteers, 
need not have been summoned to the field except to retrieve errors of 
statesmanship, self-evident to the military mind, we have only to state 
that the old array recruited to 19,000, added to the 27,000 volunteers, 
had the latter been accepted for the war, would have given the Govern- 
ment a permanent force of 46,000 men. Contrasted with this number 
the greatest strength of the Mexican army was never estimated to 
exceed 36,000 men. As these conclusions bear solely on the extrava- 
gance of our S3^stem, it is possible that they ma}^ be lightly considered 
under the popular conviction that in time of peace our economy more 
than offsets the prodigality of war, but there are other considerations 
of deeper import than dollars and cents. In a government of the people 
and for the people, more than in an}^ other, it is the duty of statesmen 
to study the means of preserving life as well as property, yet history 
shows that in proportion as the national treasure has been squandered, 
have the lives of our brave and patriotic citizen soldiers been thrown 
away. 

As an evidence of the penalty paid for entrusting raw troops to 
inexperienced officers who knew nothing of the principles governing 
their diet and health, let us again recur to statistics, taking, for exam- 
ple, the deaths by disease in the old and new regular regiments. A 
comparison of these figures shows that while the old arm}^ numbering 
from first to last 19,290, was exposed for more than two years to a sickly 
climate and lost 2,574 enlisted men, or at the rate of 6f per cent per 
annum, the new establishment, numbering but 11,186, lost in less than 
a year 2,055, or at the rate of 19 per cent per annum — a loss three 
times as great as the old regiments. 

That this loss might have been much lessened had their field officers 
been selected from the old regiments, scarcely admits of denial. 
Other figures may be quoted which should not escape the attention of 
the philanthropist. If it bo admitted that but for the unfortunate 
option granted by the law, the 27,000 volunteers first called out, in con- 
nection with the old regular establishment, would have been sufficient 
to bring the war to a speedy termination, then it must also be granted 

« At the battle of Salem Heights or Chancellorsville the One hundred and twenty- 
first New York Volunteers, after six months' training under a regular oflicer, went 
into action with 8 companies, numbering 458 men, and lost 228 killed and woumled, 
of whom 92 were killed and died of their wounds. This loss of part of a regiment in 
a single battle exceeded one-half of the loss of 53,000 men who served in the Mexi- 
can war. 



220 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

that the men who died of disease in the new regular regiments and 
among the 33,000 volunteers afterwards called out for the war, were 
the victims of unwise legislation. 
This number was as follows: 

New regular regiments: 

Officers - 36 

Men 2,055 

Volunteers for the war: 

Officers and men 4, 309 

By accident in both classes 141 

Total 6, 541 

In addition the number of men discharged (in ruined health) for 
disability was: 

New regular regiments 767 

Volunteers for the war 2, 763 

Total , 3, 530 

In paying a just tribute to the patriots who forsook their homes to 
go to a distant land, there to face the ravages of death in defense of 
the honor of the country, President Polk in his message to Congress, 
December, 1846, stated: 

Well may the American people be proud of the energy and gallantry of our regu- 
lar and volunteer officers and soldiers. The events of these few months afford a 
gratifying proof tha,t our country can, under any emergency, confidently rely for the 
maintenance of her honor and the defense of her rights on an effective force ready at 
all times voluntarily to relinquish the comforts of home for the perils and privations 
of the camp. And though such a force may be for the time expensive it is in the 
end economical, as the ability to command it removes the necessity of employing a 
large standing army in time of peace and proves that our peop'e love their institu- 
tions and are ever ready to defend and protect them." 

The views expressed in these lines undoubtedly rej^esent the aver- 
age conviction of our people it' not of our statesmen. Firmly con- 
vinced that in reducing the strength of the Regular Army without 
making any provision for its exj)ansion, our sj^stem ' ' is in the end 
economical," our representatives have suifered milit.iry organization 
to be neglected till in a moment of excitement, laws nave been enacted, 
without debate, a single defect of which, like the short enlistment 
^<5lause of the act of May, 1846, may entail the sacrifice of more than 
6,000 men. 

COST OF THE WAR. 

The mone}'^ disbursed by the pay department to the various classes 
of troops during the Mexican war was as follows: 

Permanent regular troops |2, 800, 000 

Additional regular troops 2, 294, 427 

Volunteers 10, 083, 016 

Totals 15,177,443 

The mere pay of troops is, however, but a small portion of the 
expense of carrying on war, as is shown by the following table, which 

« House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty -ninth Congress, second session, p. 22. 
& Figures furnished by Pay Department. 



MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



221 



gives the expenditures of the War and Nayy departments from the 
close of the Florida war to the year 1849: 





War. 


Navy. 


1843 a 


82,908,671.95 
5,218,183.66 
5,7)0,291.28 


53,727,711.63 


1844 


6,498,1',»9.11 


1845 


6, 297, 177. 89 








13,873,146.89 


10,523,088.53 



1846 


10,413,370.58 
35,840,030.33 
27,688,334.21 
14, .WS, 473. 26 


6,455,013.92 


1847 


7, 900, 635. 70 


1848 


9,408,470.02 


1849 


9, 780, 705. 92 








88,500,208.38 


33,550,831.62 



(I For the half year from January 1, 1843, to June 30, 1843. 

These figures show that while by reducing the Army to 8,000 men 
the expenditures during the two and a half years preceding the war 
were but $13,873,140.80, or at the rate of $5,549,258.75 per annum, 
the expenditures for the next four years were $88,500,208.38, or at 
the rate of $17,700,041.07 per annum. 

LESSONS OF THE WAR. 

Notwithstanding its unnecessary prolongation the Mexican war 
marked a great change if not a revolution in our militaiy policy. This 
result was due to the decay and gradual abandonment of the militia 
system which up to that time had been regarded as the "great bul- 
wark of national defense." Bearing in mind that the laws under which 
militaiy operations were prosecuted were almost identical with the 
laws of 1812 let us examine the composition of the forces employed 
in the two wars: 





War of 

1812. 


War with 
Mexico. 




a 50, 000 

4.58,463 

13, 159 


31,024 


Militia ., 


12, 601 




660,659 






Total 


521,622 


104, 284 







a This figure is approximate. The return for September, 1814, gave the aggregate strength of the 
Army at 38,186. The report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1874, p. 30, gives the number of men, 
including sailors and marines, wlio served twelve months or more, at 63,179. From this estimate 
there should still be deducted twelve months' rangers and volunteers. 

6 In the Mexican war it will be remembered that 11,211 men were mustered in for six months, but 
held only for three, the legal term of the militia. In reality these men, as also in all probability the 
1,390, should be considered volunteers rather than militia, inasmuch as militia service was no longer 
obligatory in any of the States. 

The percentage of the different classes of troops to the total number 
of men employed in the two wars was as follows: 





War of 
1812. 


Mexican 
war. 






521,622 

10 

88 

2 


104,284 




per cent. . 


30 


Militia 


....do.... 


12 




do.... 


5ft 







222 MILITAEY POLICY OF THE UISTITED STATES. 

A comparison of these figures shows that while in the War of 1812 
the combined force of regulars and volunteers of twelve or more months' 
service was but 12 per cent of the total number of troops employed, 
the same force in the Mexican war was no less than 88 per cent. The 
contrast does not stop here. In the first war, relying upon the States 
instead of appealing directly to the people as intended by the Consti- 
tution, Congress became a witness of disasters like those which occurred 
in the Revolution; in the second, the national troops, organized and 
supported by Congress, achieved a series of victories unmarred by a 
single defeat. 

In one war, an army of more than 6,000 raw troops, posted in the 
defense of our own capital, fled with a loss of but 19 killed and wounded; 
in the other a force of less than 5,000 trained volunteers, supported by 
a few regular troops, overthrew a Mexican army of four times its 
number. 

In one war, an enemy numbering less than 5,000 men baffled all of 
our efforts at invasion; in the other our army, with less than 6,000 
combatants, entered in triumph the enemy's capital. 

But the difference between the results of the two wars is not wholly 
to be ascribed to the substitution of national volunteers for the militia. 
In the war of 1812 the Regular Army, which had itself to be created, 
was unable to furnish a standard of skill and discipline. In the Mexican 
war, aside from sustaining the principal losses in killed and wounded, 
it furnished able commanders, and in every field set a"n example of 
skill, fortitude, and courage. 

As to the influence of military education in producing such diversity 
of results. General Scott, who, in 1814, was compelled to teach the 
regular ofiicers of his brigade the elements of squad drill, left his 
views to the Senate in the memorable words: 

I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between 
the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or 
five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; 
whereas in less than two camijaigns we conquered a great country and a peace with- 
out the loss of a single battle or skirmish.* 

«Cullum's Biographical Register of the Ofiicers and Graduates of the United States 
Military Academy, preface, vol. 1, p. 11. 



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